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To Control or Not to Control Stereotypes

Separating the Implicit and Explicit Processes of Perspective-Taking and Suppression

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INTRODUCTION

Control. If only we could regulate our thoughts, our behavior, and our social interactions more effectively, we and those around us would be better off. We would eat less, exercise more, rein in our tempers, and reveal less discrimination and prejudice toward others. We are constantly attempting to exert control over the content and nature of our cognitive processes. Attempts at mental control, however, do not always meet with success. Controlling mental content and processes can have both intended (explicit) and unintended (implicit) effects on judgments and behavior. Whether mental control succeeds or fails depends largely, not only on the explicit processes that attempts at control were meant to activate, but also the often ironic implicit processes that were incidentally activated.

The motivation to control and regulate our social thoughts and behavior, especially with regard to stereotyping and prejudice, is driven by the fact that, in contemporary society, individuals are judged on the views they

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articulate and the meanings expressed in their social behavior, all evaluated against a standard of "correctness." Any interpersonal behavior, verbal or nonverbal, that suggests discrimination is subject to condemnation, with the potential for public censorship and legal sanction, as well as internal compunction. A suffocating atmosphere is often created in which utterances and actions possess a foreboding quality and are bathed in suspicion. We take the burden and constraints of this potentially paralyzing situation as a point of departure. How do individuals navigate a social world that is increasingly multicultural without displaying attitudes that could be the fodder for accusations? What strategies are most effective in debiasing social thought, of calibrating one's actions with contemporary social mores?

In this chapter we discuss two strategies that individuals can use to reduce stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination: perspective-taking and suppression. We explore the separation of the conscious, explicit effects from the nonconscious, implicit effects activated by each attempt at control and how the effectiveness of each strategy as a means of reducing stereotypes depends on these separate processes. With suppression, individuals attempt to actively banish stereotypic thoughts from consciousness and to replace those thoughts with more acceptable ones. Although stereotype suppression under some circumstances can reduce the accessibility and influence of stereotypic thoughts and increase the accessibility and influence of counterstereotypic thoughts, it can also, ironically and unintentionally, produce the very thoughts one is suppressing (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994a). Because of this insidious implicit process, its use as a strategy for stereotype control is suspect. Perspective-taking, on the other hand, implicitly increases the overlap between representations of the self and representations of the other; typically, the representation of the other becomes more self-like, or similar to one's own self-conception (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). This perspective-taking-induced increase in self–other overlap appears to be a crucial mechanism in controlling stereotyping and out-group evaluations. When an individual's own self-concept is positive, as is typically the case, then perspective-taking reduces stereotyping and improves the evaluations of out-groups. But when an individual's self-concept is negative, either chronically or temporarily, then perspective-taking can lead to negative evaluations of the out-group. Suppression and perspective-taking can both have positive effects on controlling the influence of stereotypes, but their effectiveness depends on which process, the explicit or the implicit, is the crucial input into a judgment or behavior. We discuss first the nature of and the relationship between implicit and explicit processes and their role in producing and reducing the effects of stereotypes on judgments and behavior before turning to the specific strategies of suppression and perspective-taking.

THE EXPLICIT AND THE IMPLICIT

The distinction between explicit and implicit processes in social judgment comes from the work on distinguishing between explicit and implicit memory (Schacter, 1994). *Explicit memory* refers to the conscious recollection of some prior event, whereas *implicit memory* refers to situations in which cognitive processes are affected by a prior event or experience, even when there is no conscious awareness of how the prior experience is affecting current cognition. Facilitation effects – increased ease in processing some stimuli – are often taken as evidence that implicit memory is at work. Research on implicit and explicit memory suggests that the two systems are functionally independent of each other; prior experiences that affect judgment may or may not be retrievable in an explicit memory test. Further evidence for their functional independence comes from research that suggests that these implicit and explicit processes emerge from distinct neurological systems (see Lieberman, this volume; Zárate & Stoever, this volume). The fact that many mental processes can be described as implicit means that we often tell more than we know (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nisbett and Wilson pointed out that many judgments, even ones that rely on complex attributional logic, are produced through cognitive processes to which the individual has no introspective access. Individuals are only aware of the judgment made, not the process that produced it, and they may not even be aware that their current judgment or attitude has changed in any appreciable way. Thus, individuals are often unaware of dissonance-induced shifts in attitudes (Goethals & Reckman, 1973) or that an environmental stimulus has affected their judgments (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Even important goals can be implicitly activated and pursued without conscious awareness (see Chartrand & Jefferis, this volume).

Judgments often get transformed when an implicit process becomes an explicit one. For example, exposure to trait words in a prior context produces assimilation effects on later impression formation judgments, but only when those traits are no longer (explicitly) held in consciousness. However, when one is still conscious of the traits at the time of judgment – for example, when an individual is reminded of the trait words that he or she had previously seen – contrast effects result in which judgments become less consistent with the implications of the traits than if they had not been seen at all (Martin, 1986; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Stapel, Koomen, & van der Plight, 1997). When one has these trait terms in explicit memory one will explicitly attempt to remove their potential biasing influence and to reset one's judgment, thereby producing contrast effects (Martin, 1986). Judgments thus are fundamentally altered, depending on whether the primed traits are exerting an influence through an implicit or an explicit process.

Implicit and explicit processes are linked to the conceptual distinction between automatic and controlled processes (but see Kruglanski et al., this volume, for a critique of dual-process models). Bargh (1994) suggested that automatic cognitive processes possess a number of features: They tend to be unintentional, occur outside of awareness, and are uncontrollable and efficient (i.e., consume minimal attentional resources). Few mental activities, however, meet all the requirements for automaticity. For example, traits are often inferred from behavioral descriptions, and these trait inferences often occur outside of awareness and without intent, but they are not uncontrollable or entirely free from attentional limitations (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994).

Some researchers have placed implicit and explicit processes into a temporal sequence. Gilbert (1989) suggests that when we try to understand why an event occurred, we implicitly and immediately make a dispositional attribution for that event, locating causality in some fundamental personality aspect of one of the individuals, and only later, and with effort, explicitly consider the situational forces that contributed to the event (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Similarly, when encountering a proposition or statement, we implicitly and immediately believe it to be true, and only later, with great effort, do we adjust our assessment for potential duplicity (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). The sequence but not the implicit–explicit order can be reversed. Thus, implicit dispositional attributions followed by situational adjustment can become implicit situational attributions that are followed by explicit attempts to adjust for dispositions when one has the processing goal of discovering the nature of the situation (Krull, 1993). Similarly, when one believes that the environment is beset on all sides by mendacity, one implicitly remembers a proposition as false, and only later, through explicit recall, takes into account its potential veracity (Skurnik, 1998). These models suggest that an initial implicit response is corrected for by an explicit process; the explicit process helps override an implicit bias.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING

The literature, especially that of stereotyping and prejudice, on explicit and implicit processes tends to paint them as either/or propositions: One is activating either an implicit process or an explicit process. Not only are the processes considered distinct, but they tend to be instantiated by very different measures: The measurement of stereotyping and prejudice is often divided into implicit (e.g., reaction time) and explicit measures (e.g., scales). There is considerable debate over whether implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice are correlated (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). In some studies, the implicit prejudice

measure is reliably associated with participants' scores on explicit racial attitude measures (Wittenbrink et al., 1997; von Hippel et al., 1997). In other studies, there is no relationship between the implicit and explicit measures (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).

Given the often low correlations between implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping, these measures are often pitted against each other in predicting behavior (see von Hippel, Vargas, & Sekaquaptewa, this volume, for the importance of focusing not only on the content of stereotypes and prejudice, but also on the processes initiated by these attitudes). It should be noted that observed behavior may not always be explicit. Overt prejudicial or discriminatory behavior would, of course, be considered to be produced through an explicit process, but more ambiguous behaviors, ones that suggest interpersonal discomfort, such as avoiding eye contact, may be considered more implicit, engaged in without awareness or intent or controllability. In fact, there appears to be a relationship between the method of measurement and the prediction of subsequent behaviors that depends on the explicit–implicit distinction. Implicit attitudes tend to be better predictors of spontaneous judgments and nonverbal behaviors, whereas explicit attitude measures are a more reliable predictor of evaluative judgments and deliberative behaviors such as legal decisions (Dovidio et al., 1997). Explicit measures predict certain behavioral choices and preferences (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Implicit measures predict nonverbal behaviors in interracial interactions (Fazio et al., 1995). Some have suggested that the implicit measures are the more reliable measures of stereotyping and prejudice because they are nonreactive and less prone to manipulation by social desirability concerns (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Others have suggested that implicit stereotypes have functional roots in that they allow us to understand the buzzing and chaotic cauldron of complex information with relative ease and efficiency, thereby freeing up scarce cognitive resources for other concurrent tasks; stereotyping, rather than being a product of a design flaw, might actually be considered an evolutionarily produced design feature that increases cognitive efficiency (Haselton & Buss, this volume; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).

Because implicit processes are often initiated without intent, without awareness, and without control, many have suggested strategies designed to reduce stereotyping and discrimination by overriding these implicit processes through the use of explicit ones. In addition, explicit processes are thought to be required to reduce stereotyping because implicit processes are believed to be overlearned and thus resistant to change. Typically, these strategies of overriding implicit processes through the use of explicit processes involve increasing the motivation or altering the processing goals that individuals have in interactions. Making a perceiver interdependent

with a stereotyped target decreases reliance on the stereotype in forming an impression of that person (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Processing goals focusing on content that is irrelevant to social categorization (e.g., looking for a white dot on photographs of women) do not lead to the automatic activation of stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Another approach makes the implicit explicit by alerting people to implicit processes and their connection to stereotyping and bias. In fact, this approach is very much a part of consciousness-raising efforts. Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) have shown that making people aware of an implicit response that could belie discrimination has a dramatic effect on self-perceptions. Awareness of the biasing influence of an implicit stereotyping process produces guilt and motivates the individual to override that response through the use of an explicit process.

For an explicit process to be employed, one needs not only motivation but also cognitive capacity. When motivation is high but cognitive capacity is low, the implicit processes will dominate and evidence of stereotyping will be observed (at least on an implicit measure) (Bodenhausen, 1990). This suggests that the best way to reduce the bias of an implicit process is to change the implicit process itself. In fact, explicit processes may over time become habitualized and thus become implicit. Stereotyping itself has been likened to a habit; in the presence of a stereotyped target, a habitualized response occurs: the automatic activation of negative and potentially pernicious stereotypes. Many people have attempted to explore how one can change or alter such habits by creating different (more positive) associations that hopefully can become habitualized themselves. The link between the group representation and the stereotype can be severed by training participants to replace the stereotype with a different set of beliefs (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). In the Kawakami et al. experiments, participants responded with a forceful "no" whenever a stereotype term accompanied a photograph of a member of the stereotyped group and an enthusiastic "yes" when nonstereotypic traits accompanied a photograph. This training, which required an extensive number of trials, proved successful in reducing the automatic activation of stereotypes. For those committed to the goal of egalitarianism, not only is the stereotype not activated in the presence of an African American (Moskowitz et al., 1999), but the egalitarian goal itself gets activated (Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000). Egalitarian goals, rather than stereotypes, can become the habitualized response that guides information processing.

These studies raise the question of where implicit and explicit processes come from. Recent work suggests that implicit attitudes are the result of environmental pairings. To alter an implicit attitude, one does not need to engage conscious attention toward replacing thoughts; one simply needs

to modify the pairings found in the environment (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Encountering an African American in a nonthreatening situation (e.g., at a family barbeque) activates the positive aspects of a stereotype, whereas encountering the same person in a more threatening situation (e.g., a dimly lit street) activates the negative components of the stereotype (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Explicit attitudes, on the other hand, are consciously held endorsements that reflect personal values and beliefs as well as observable social norms. With explicit attitudes, it is proposed, more overt attempts at persuasion would be necessary to alter these attitudes.

Implicit and explicit processes are often described as being in opposition with each other, with one process producing a response on the opposite end of the continuum as the other response. However, implicit and explicit processes can independently produce the same judgment or they can work in concert with each other. Work on illusory correlations suggest that stereotyping and prejudice can result from a mix of implicit and explicit processes (Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994). The co-occurrence of infrequent and thus distinctive events (a numerical minority group member performing a negative behavior) attracts attention, and more time is spent processing and considering this information. This increase in attention leads perceivers to overestimate the frequency of such co-occurrences. The infrequency of the two distinctive events implicitly attracts attention, and this leads to the greater availability of these events in explicit memory (but see Fiedler & Freytag, this volume, for a discussion of the possible pseudocontingent basis of illusory correlations).

We suggest that attempts to direct cognition toward a goal often activate implicit and explicit processes simultaneously. Rather than simply overriding an implicit process with an explicit one or making an explicit response an implicit one through practice, attempts to control will often produce simultaneous processes, some that are more explicit and others that are more implicit. In addition, the strategies that have been effective in overriding or transforming implicitly produced bias have a number of drawbacks. Focusing on nonsocial aspects of the environment (Macrae et al., 1997) may not be a practical way to interact with others. Although spending extensive amounts of time training to negate negative responses to stereotyped targets (Kawakami et al., 2000) may be an effective long-term strategy, it may not provide an individual with an immediate mechanism to deal with a current interaction. Likewise, we may not have a choice about the environment in which we encounter a stereotyped target (Wittenbrink et al., 2001) or we may not find ourselves in an interdependent situation (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). As an alternative, the remainder of this chapter focuses on two different individual strategies, perspective-taking and

stereotype suppression, that individuals may use to reduce and control stereotyping in a variety of settings, and the implicit and explicit processes associated with each strategy.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES OF SUPPRESSION

One intuitively appealing strategy for reducing the accessibility of stereotypes and avoiding bias and prejudice is to suppress any references to stereotypes, to actively deny them entrance into consciousness. The decision to engage in suppression activates two concurrent cognitive systems: an intentional, explicit operating system and an implicit, "ironic" monitoring system (Wegner, 1994). When a particular mental state is avoided (such as when one is asked to avoid stereotypical thoughts), the operating process seeks items inconsistent with that state; these serve as distracters, attempting to make the mind full so that undesired thoughts cannot enter (Wegner & Erber, 1992). The operating system is thus an explicit process of replacement. The monitoring process, on the other hand, is tuned to detect failures of mental control and scans the mental landscape for references to the unwanted thoughts. It is the interplay of the explicit operating system and the implicit monitoring system that determines the effectiveness of suppression. The (explicit) operating system is hypothesized to depend on an abundance of cognitive resources, whereas the (implicit) monitoring system is presumed to be an efficient process that does not depend on cognitive resources to function effectively. The introduction of concurrent tasks or other drains on resource availability can reduce the effectiveness of and essentially disable the (explicit) operating system, leaving the (implicit) monitoring system running unchecked. The disabled operating system cannot prevent the monitoring system's successful searches for the unwanted thoughts from reaching consciousness. Because suppression activates both the explicit operating system and the implicit monitoring system, attempts to suppress a thought or mental state can give rise to ironic effects in which the decision to engage in suppression can lead those very thoughts to become more, rather than less, accessible.

Wegner, Erber, and Bowman (1993, cited in Wegner, 1994) demonstrated that when resource depletion is paired with the intention to suppress stereotypic thoughts, stereotypes become more accessible than when no cognitive load exists. This might imply that the ironic effects of thought suppression would emerge only when the operating system is disabled by a secondary task introducing a cognitive load. However, once the intention to suppress has been discontinued, the suppressed thoughts often become more accessible and influential in subsequent judgments and behavior, a phenomenon known as *rebound effects* (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). The monitoring system, in its search for traces of

the unwanted thought, serves as a subliminal priming mechanism. Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994), Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994), and Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) demonstrated that engaging in and then discontinuing the suppression of stereotypic thoughts leads to rebound effects, that is, greater accessibility of the stereotype compared to a control condition. In line with Dovidio et al.'s (1997) work, the ironic effects of suppression, caused by the implicit monitoring system, seem to have a greater impact on implicit effects (stereotype accessibility, interpersonal distancing) than on explicit effects (stereotype expression and overt discrimination) (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998). Whereas Galinsky (1999) found that suppressors explicitly rated a stereotype target as being more similar to themselves, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that suppression led to interpersonal distancing behaviors (sitting farther away from a stereotype target), behavior assumed to be implicit effects not typically under conscious control. Neither Galinsky and Moskowitz nor Monteith et al. found reliable effects of suppression on later stereotype expression. Yet, both found reliable effects of suppression on later stereotype accessibility. These results suggest that where bias is most invidious, at the implicit level, the decision to suppress ultimately leaves individuals worse off than if no attempt at suppression had occurred.

Is this really the case? Remember that as the monitoring system is scanning for references to the suppressed thought, the operating system is searching for distractors to fill the mind. In much of the research on stereotype suppression, researchers have failed to look for the accessibility and influence of these distracter thoughts. More importantly, they have failed to look at the relative accessibility of the suppressed thoughts compared to the distracters. In fact, thought suppression is most efficient when there are readily available distracters to take the place of the suppressed thought in consciousness; rebound effects can be eliminated when specific replacement thoughts are provided (Wegner et al., 1987). Kelly and Kahn (1994) suggested that individuals are able to avoid rebound effects with their own recurring, intrusive thoughts because they have developed a rich tapestry of distracters. But where do the distracters come from? How do people attempt to stay present in an interracial or intergender interaction while suppressing stereotypic thoughts?

One possible way to resolve this dilemma is to focus on counterstereotypic information. That is, when attempting to suppress the stereotype of African Americans, an individual might replace stereotypic items that spring to mind (e.g., hostile) with their antonyms (e.g., kind). The constant process of replacing stereotypic thoughts with counterstereotypic ones should serve to make the counterstereotype as accessible as or more accessible than the stereotype under conditions of suppression. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) investigated whether both the stereotype and

the counterstereotype could become hyperaccessible following stereotype suppression. They utilized the paradigm of Macrae and colleagues (1994) and Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) for their investigation. Participants were asked to write a "day in the life" narrative essay of a photographed African American man. In a *stereotype suppression condition*, participants were told to actively avoid thinking about the photographed target in a stereotypical manner. In a *stereotype expression condition*, participants were told to use the cultural stereotype (rather than their personal beliefs) of the group represented in the photograph when constructing their narrative essays. A no-prime control group did not write a narrative essay, nor did they even see the photograph of the African American man; they simply started with the later tasks. Following that task and a number of filler tasks, participants completed a lexical decision task that measured the relative accessibility of stereotype-consistent, stereotype-irrelevant, and counterstereotypic words. The results demonstrated a previously undocumented effect of suppression: Suppression led both the stereotype and the counterstereotype to be hyperaccessible (beyond levels evidenced in participants actually asked to express the stereotype and the no-prime control group). In addition, the counterstereotype was just as accessible as the stereotype for suppressors; stereotype expressers, on the other hand, showed an accessibility advantage for the stereotype over the counterstereotype.

Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) also examined the judgmental consequences of stereotype suppression, looking at which construct, the stereotype or the counterstereotype, would dominate impressions of a later person perception target. The priming literature suggests that the more accessible a construct is, the more likely that construct will be used to categorize and make sense of a stimulus object. When two constructs are equally applicable a priori to a social object, the more accessible one will be used to categorize the object (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1996). Given that the accessibility of both the stereotype and the counterstereotype is increased following stereotype suppression, which construct will win the race toward categorization of a subsequent ambiguous target is an open question.

Whether the counterstereotype or the stereotype is used to categorize a race-neutral target following suppression might depend on the type of judgment participants make. Suppressors who are asked to rate the target person along a stereotype-consistent dimension might produce more extreme (and stereotypical) judgments, but suppressors asked to rate targets along a counterstereotype dimension might also produce more extreme (but less stereotypical) ratings. This is precisely what Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) found. Participants asked to suppress the stereotype of African Americans and then evaluated a target person along a stereotype-consistent dimension (hostility) judged that person in a stereotype-consistent fashion. However, those participants asked to rate

the same person performing the same behaviors along a different, applicable dimension that was counter to the stereotype (honesty), actually judged the target person in a more counterstereotypic way than a control condition.

The simultaneous accessibility of the stereotype and counterstereotype runs counter to research that has found the active inhibition of counterstereotypic traits (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996) and exemplars (Rothbart, Sriram, & Davis-Stitt, 1996) following stereotype activation. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) asserted that categories compete to "capture" or categorize a stimulus, with active inhibition of the competing constructs. The inhibition of stereotype-inconsistent information in the face of stereotype activation promotes efficient social perception (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Suppression prevents this competitive inhibition because counterstereotypic information provides useful distracters to assist in preventing the emergence of the stereotype into consciousness. Thus, the counterstereotype is not inhibited in the context of stereotype activation. In fact, the results of Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) suggest that stereotype-consistent and counterstereotype words serve as mutually reinforcing retrieval cues following suppression. Suppression creates a unique context in which the stereotype and counterstereotype activate, rather than inhibit, each other. Wegner (1994) has pointed out the often ironic and paradoxical effects that emerge from attempts to control the contents of consciousness. The results of Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) add another irony of suppression – the simultaneous accessibility of the stereotype and its foe, the counterstereotype.

We have suggested that the stereotype and counterstereotype owe their increased accessibility following a suppression goal to two different cognitive systems, the implicit monitoring system and the explicit operating system, respectively. Further, these two systems are posited to depend differentially on the availability of cognitive resources (Wegner, 1994). The implicit monitoring system tends to be resource independent and continues to function regardless of whether attention is divided. The explicit operating system is more effortful and is disabled when cognitive resources are low. Although the counterstereotype is more accessible following suppression, its level of accessibility may depend on the availability of cognitive resources.

Dividing the attention of perceivers should lead the stereotype, but not the counterstereotype, to continue to show evidence of increased accessibility. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2002) tested this notion and found that for suppressors placed under conditions of cognitive resource deprivation, the stereotype still showed increased accessibility, but the counterstereotype no longer revealed higher levels of accessibility compared to stereotype expressers. These results support the notion that suppression increases the accessibility of both the stereotype and counterstereotype but through two

different cognitive systems, one implicit and one explicit. The stereotype is made accessible through the more automatic and resource-independent monitoring system. The counterstereotype is made accessible through the effortful and resource-dependent operating system; consequently, its increased accessibility is vulnerable to reductions in cognitive resources. The counterstereotype can still direct judgments following suppression but only when there is an abundance of cognitive resources at the suppressor's disposal.

Overall, suppression has multifaceted effects on cognition and judgments that depend on the relationship between the implicit monitoring system and the explicit operating system. Although suppression routinely reduces the expression of stereotypes, it not only fails to reduce but can exacerbate stereotyping and bias at the implicit, nonconscious level. Ultimately, it is only under specific circumstances – when judgments are made along counterstereotypical dimensions under optimal conditions of high cognitive capacity – that suppression will lead to decreased rather than increased stereotyping.

Is there an alternative strategy that harnesses different explicit and implicit processes, one that is less vulnerable to ironic failures of control? The next section explores the role of perspective-taking in reducing stereotype accessibility and expression.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES OF PERSPECTIVE-TAKING

The ability to entertain the perspective of another has long been recognized as a critical ingredient in proper social functioning (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1983; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932). Perspective-taking has been shown to make the evaluations of others more positive (Davis et al., 1996), to increase sensitivity to the plight of others (Clore & Jeffery, 1972), to provide more situational attributions for another's behavior (Regan & Totten, 1975), and ultimately to increase altruistic displays (Batson, 1998) and facilitate reaching optimal negotiated settlements (Galinsky & White, 2002).

Given all the benefits that appear to result from perspective-taking, what are the mechanisms by which perspective-taking exerts its influence? Perspective-taking appears to lead to a self–other merging or overlap (Davis et al., 1996), in which the representation of the target comes to resemble the perspective-taker's own self-representation. Davis et al. found that ascription of self-descriptive traits to the target was not due to increased liking for the target, but rather to the cognitive accessibility of the self-concept. This suggests that there are two separate processes involved in perspective-taking – a conscious, explicit effect and a nonconscious, implicit effect. When perspective-takers are asked direct questions about the target person, they will presumably feel that the perspective-taking

manipulation is relevant to that judgment and will consciously give responses that are consistent with that manipulation. However, during perspective-taking, the self-concept gets implicitly activated and applied the target. Further evidence for the implicit effect of self-concept activation by perspective-taking manipulations comes from the fact that the increases in self–other overlap are generally impervious to reductions in cognitive capacity (Davis et al., 1996). Cognitive load interfered with the effortful act of perspective-taking and the general ascription of traits, but left the more automatic process, the ascription of self-relevant traits, intact. Perspective-taking manipulations typically involve explicitly imagining either (1) how a target feels or is affected by his or her situation or (2) how you would feel and would be affected if you were the target (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). Increased self–target overlap occurs both when participants imagine themselves in the target's place and when they imagine what it would be like to be the target (Davis et al., 1996). Although the emotional responses do appear to be affected by the type of perspective-taking manipulation (Batson et al., 1997; Stotland, 1969), the implicit effects of perspective-taking appear to be independent of the type of manipulation.

The increased self–other overlap following perspective-taking has implications for intergroup relations because recent research has found that it is the in-group's association with the self that leads to ethnocentric responses in favor of the in-group (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Smith & Henry, 1996). Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) proposed that the increased accessibility of the self-concept following perspective-taking could result in the use of the self-concept rather than the stereotype in categorizing and evaluating a member of a stereotyped group. Although perspective-taking manipulations increase liking for the target and activate emotional responses that imply sympathy and empathy, Galinsky and Moskowitz predicted that it would be self–other overlap that would mediate the effects of perspective-taking on stereotype accessibility and application. This mediation would result because liking and emotional reactions are explicit processes activated by perspective-taking, whereas self–other overlap is an implicit process. Given that implicit processes tend to affect implicit measures (Dovidio et al., 1997) and stereotype accessibility tends to be an implicit measure, self–other overlap should mediate the effects of perspective-taking on stereotyping.

The experiments presented in Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) support this distinction between the conscious, explicit processes and nonconscious, implicit processes associated with perspective-taking. In Experiment 1, perspective-taking decreased stereotype expression and increased positive evaluations of the target expressed in the narrative essays of a photographed elderly man. In addition, perspective-taking prevented the hyperaccessibility of the stereotype compared to stereotype suppressors and a control condition. Thus, perspective-taking decreased bias on both

the conscious, explicit task (i.e., narrative essay) and the nonconscious, implicit task (i.e., a reaction time measure of stereotype accessibility). In addition, the explicit effect of expressing more positive evaluations in their narrative essays did not mediate the implicit effect of decreased stereotype accessibility. In fact, covarying the effect of the evaluations expressed in the first narrative essay increased rather than decreased the effect of the manipulations on stereotype accessibility.

Although Experiment 1 of Galinsky and Moskowitz is suggestive of the notion that the nonconscious effect of decreased stereotype accessibility is mediated by activation of the self-concept, it did not measure self-concept accessibility or self–other overlap. In a second experiment, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) explored whether this implicit effect of increased self–other overlap following perspective-taking was a better predictor of reduced stereotyping than the explicit effect of expressing more positive evaluations. Perspective-taking increased evaluations of the target individual in the narrative essays, increased the overlap between representations of the self and representations of the elderly man, and reduced stereotyping. Moreover, the level of overlap was a significant predictor of reductions in stereotyping, whereas evaluations expressed in the narrative essays did not reliably predict reductions in stereotyping. Thus, the implicit effect of perspective-taking (increases in self–other overlap) rather than the explicit effect (increases in evaluations of the target of perspective-taking) is the mechanism by which perspective-taking decreases stereotyping. Implicit processes, both for perspective-taking and for suppression, appear to be more important than explicit processes in reducing stereotyping.

It should be noted that increases in self–other overlap in the Davis et al. (1996) experiments occurred for a target person who did not belong to an out-group (male participants took the perspective of a male target and female participants took the perspective of a female target). Galinsky and Moskowitz showed that increases in self–other overlap caused by perspective-taking occur even if the target of perspective-taking is a member of an out-group and this self–other overlap extends to the entire out-group. These results tend to run counter to research that shows that stereotype change is difficult to elicit because people retain their stereotypes through a process of subtyping (see Johnston & Miles, this volume). That is, targets who are perceived to be counterstereotypic are deemed to be unrepresentative of other group members (i.e., subtyped), and therefore no updating of the group representation is necessary (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997). One might expect perspective-taking to increase the tendency to treat the target of perspective-taking as atypical, and therefore to subtype that person and retain the stereotypical group representation. Perspective-taking leads to a more personalized approach toward targets (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and the more personalized the approach to a target is, the less likely stereotypes will be used in categorizing and evaluating that person (Brewer, 1996). However, the more personalized the approach to a target, the more likely that person will be subtyped and excluded from the group representation. Although personalization of a target leads to less stereotyping of that target, it does not always reduce the stereotypicality of the group representation.

Why then does perspective-taking lead group representations to be transformed and become less stereotypical, rather than result in mere subtyping and the retention of stereotypic representations? Remember that it is the self's connection to the in-group that helps create in-group biases (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Smith & Henry, 1996). In fact, connecting the self somehow to the out-group might be the key to reducing these biases (Galinsky, 2002). Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp (1997; see also Wright, Aron, & Trop, 2002), for example, found that knowledge of an in-group member's close relationship with an out-group member improved attitudes toward the out-group. Wright et al. (1997, p. 76) proposed, but did not provide evidence, that this effect is mediated by the processes of self–other overlap: "In an observed in-group/out-group friendship, the in-group member is part of the self, the out-group member is part of that in-group member's self, and hence part of myself ... then to some extent the out-group is part of myself." The self is implicitly activated during perspective-taking and becomes connected to both the target of perspective-taking and the target's group. In this way, the implicit activation of the self appears to prevent subtyping and allow instead for the representation of the out-group to become less stereotypical.

Galinsky and Ku (2003) sought further evidence that perspective-taking involves the activation and application of the self-concept and that this activation determines how out-groups are evaluated. These experiments tested the hypothesis that if perspective-taking activates the self-concept, then the positivity of one's own self-evaluation should predict how positively a perspective-taker evaluates an out-group. In one experiment, positive and negative self-evaluations were activated by providing participants with positive or negative feedback on a jury decision-making task prior to the perspective-taking manipulation. A different experiment looked at individual differences in self-evaluation, or self-esteem. In each of these experiments, participants wrote a "day in the life" essay about a photographed elderly man with either perspective-taking or control instructions and then evaluated the elderly along a number of semantic differentials. Across both experiments, positive feedback and high self-esteem led perspective-takers to evaluate the out-group more positively, than perspective-takers exposed to negative feedback or with chronic low self-esteem.

Out-group evaluations are improved only when the perspective-taker's self-concept is positive. For the perspective-taker, the self is a critical, and implicit, ingredient in shaping intergroup evaluations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the implicit and explicit processes associated with two different strategies, suppression and perspective-taking, employed to reduce stereotyping. Attempts at control, such as regulating the accessibility and expression of stereotypes and prejudice, tend to activate both implicit and explicit processes, and a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of mental control needs to take both processes into account. Suppression and perspective-taking both decrease the explicit expression of stereotypic content, and it appears that the explicit processes of each strategy are responsible for this effect. Perspective-taking accomplishes this by increasing liking, sympathy, and empathy for stereotyped targets. Suppression accomplishes this by activating an explicit operating system that fills the mind with counterstereotypic distractors. Both perspective-takers and suppressors report increased similarity with stereotype targets. On explicit measures, it appears that suppression and perspective-taking are equally suited to the task of stereotype reduction.

It is through their implicit processes and on implicit measures that the effectiveness of suppression and perspective-taking in controlling stereotyping starts to diverge. With suppression, the implicit process of monitoring the environment for references to a negative stereotype increases the accessibility of that stereotype. In addition, the explicit evoking of counterstereotypic thoughts, but not the implicit scanning for stereotypic references, is dependent on cognitive resources. Thus, under conditions of diminished cognitive capacity, the stereotype reigns supreme and suppression appears to increase rather than decrease stereotyped biases. On the other hand, perspective-taking implicitly activates and applies the self-concept to stereotypic targets and groups; it is the self-concept and not the stereotype that wins out in the categorization process. The implicit process of self–other overlap mediates the perspective-taking-induced reductions in stereotyping, whereas the implicit process of monitoring the environment for suggestive references to negative stereotypes increases stereotyping during and after suppression. However, the implicit processes involved in perspective-taking can have their drawbacks. Whereas cognitive load is the Achilles' heel of suppression, low self-esteem, either temporary or chronic, can lead perspective-takers to evaluate stereotyped groups and targets less positively. Given that most individuals in Western cultures have high self-esteem (Crocker & Bylsma, 1996) and that

concurrent tasks and cognitive load pervade mental life, it appears that perspective-taking is generally more effective than suppression in reducing stereotyping.

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