FROM SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION TO SYSTEM CONDEMNATION: ANTECEDENTS OF ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE POWER HIERARCHIES

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ABSTRACT

When will individuals accept or reject systems that subordinate them, when will they take actions that will challenge these status hierarchies, and when will such challenges be more intense, overt, and non-normative? Research suggests that individuals often justify and maintain systems that subordinate them, yet we suggest that there are certain boundary conditions that predict when individuals will no longer accept their place in such systems. We propose a model that examines how multiple factors: A sense of power, emotions associated with power, and perceptions of the system's legitimacy and stability – predict when those in low power will act against authority or when they will act to justify and maintain such systems. We also suggest that the level and type of action taken against a hierarchy changes as more of the elements (i.e., sense of power, emotions, perceptions of the status hierarchy) of our model are present. We predict

that the actions taken against hierarchies become more overt and non-normative as more of these factors are present.

Disobedience, in the eyes of anyone who has read history, is man's original virtue. It is through disobedience that progress has been made, through disobedience and through rebellion.
   Oscar Wilde

I have learned through bitter experience the one supreme lesson to conserve my anger, and as heat conserved is transmuted into energy, even so our anger controlled can be transmuted into a power that can move the world.
   Mahatma Gandhi

Many wish that the world could be hierarchy free, a land of true equality. There would be no subjugation, no reason for some to live in luxury and others to live in shackles. Against this ideal is evidence that hierarchies are inevitable, that no society exists without them (Sidanius, 1993). The existence of power hierarchies often translates directly into the oppression of lower power individuals. However, subordinated individuals do not always act to counter this oppression. This chapter seeks to understand the conditions under which individuals seek to change the hierarchies that oppress them. We propose a model that stipulates when group members will be most likely to act against authority to change a social hierarchy: when actors have a sense of power, particular emotions are salient, and actors perceive that the hierarchy is illegitimate and malleable.

A useful starting point in considering when individuals will act to change hierarchies is the growing literature on system justification in social psychology. A number of scholars have suggested those individuals who lack social power tend to accept their subordinated place (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and accept "hierarchy legitimizing myths" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) that explain, situate, and normalize the hierarchy. System justification by both high- and low-power individuals reduces group-based conflict and provides social order. System justification theory holds that elites are producers of hierarchy legitimizing myths, and that low-power individuals are consumers of these myths, while elites and low-power individuals together complicitly maintain the hierarchy (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991). Although the system justification perspective usefully illuminates the psychological mechanisms underlying the maintenance of a hierarchy, it says little about when low-power individuals will act to change the hierarchy.

However, when members of a social system seek to change power hierarchies is an issue that cuts across disciplinary boundaries and is at the heart of the sociological literature on social movements. Since the work of Robert Park and his associates, collective action and social movements have been recognized as extra institutional sources of social change. In contrast to panics, riots, fads, and fashions that are evanescent forms of collective behavior with few structured roles, collective action refers to a broad range of purposive collective behavior, the most organized of which are social movements that occur over longer time stretches, are driven by long-term goals, and develop formal organizations. Social movement theorists emphasize that social change is possible when there are political opportunities, activists who frame grievances and provide solutions, and organizational vehicles to mobilize and channel individual dissatisfaction into organized challenges of the status quo (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1997; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1994). Although the social movement literature usefully specifies the macro-structural conditions necessary for collective action, it overlooks the psychological processes that prompt individuals to act against a system.[1]

Social movement theory insists that protest is possible only when there are political opportunities, vehicles of mobilization, and framing activities by activists (McAdam et al., 1997). In this literature, political opportunity exists when the political system is open to expression of alternative views, the state has a low capacity and propensity to repress protest; relationships among members of the elites are unstable and can be exploited by challengers; and challengers have access to allies in the elite. Mobilizing structures include organizational vehicles ranging from informal networks to formal social movement organizations, and strategic framing consists of efforts by activists to assign blame to the system, and to proffer a solution that motivates action (Benford & Snow, 2000). Although the social movement perspective is very useful, it is more a theory of where collective action originates and it makes a distinction between special purpose activists and regular recruits, but says little about how the activist in all of us is aroused and awakened. A notable deficiency of the social movement literature is that it has glossed over how actors may be differentially involved (Stryker, 2000). Explaining how actors are differentially involved requires that we shed light on how political opportunity influences the cognitive beliefs of individuals with respect to alternatives; how it is not only objective power, but also a subjective sense of power that triggers action, and how cultural framings trigger perceptions of illegitimacy, and thereby, motivate individual action.

In this chapter we develop a typology that captures the range of actions that those in low-power positions might take in response to their subordination. To do so we propose that two orthogonal dimensions, how overt the action is and how non-normative it is, can provide a framework for understanding actions taken in response to subjugation. One distinction is between types of collective action, normative versus non-normative action (see Martin, 1986). Normative actions geared towards improving a group's (or individual's) station and position in a hierarchy functions within the confines of the current system; conversely, actions may be non-normative, existing outside the rules that govern the current social arrangements. The second distinction concerns whether the action taken is overt or covert. Overt actions are those in which the interests and the intentions behind the actions are known, and covert action occurs when those with power are unaware of the identities or intentions of the action taken (Morrill, Zald, & Rao, 2003).

In this chapter we develop a model of action against authority by presenting three lines of argument. We contend that when those who are subordinated by a hierarchy overtly and non-normatively act against that system, to try to reverse that hierarchy, three psychological conditions are involved. First, possessing a sense of power, despite one's subordinated position, may be an important precursor to perceiving one's lack of structural power as something that is not fixed but changeable. While those with more resources, as social movement theory holds, may have a greater sense of power, the sense of power can also be independent of objective factors, and so actors with a sense of power may still act against the system despite their lack of objective resources. Second, experiencing certain emotions often associated with high power (e.g., pride and anger) may lead individuals towards system condemnation and action. We propose that those with a high sense of power may be motivated emotionally to structurally reform the system, whereas those with a low sense of power may be consumed by negative emotion and may be more likely to act against the system through acts such as covert sabotage. That is, a sense of power and emotional states may interact to not only predict the amount or level of action, but also the type of action. Finally, drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) we propose that seeing the hierarchy as illegitimate, unstable and impermeable to individual advancement appears to be an important precursor to taking action against systems. Thus, political opportunity and framing together might provide the macro-cultural pre-conditions, but it is individual perspectives concerning the legitimacy, stability, and impermeability of the hierarchy that induce individuals to opt for collective voice

options rather than an individual exit option (Hirschman, 1970). We argue that when a sense of power, certain emotions, and beliefs about system illegitimacy and instability are present, individuals may use more overt forms of voice. If all or some of these factors are absent, then individuals will simply not act, or they will be more likely to resort to covert (as opposed to overt) forms of voice and attempt to alter the system by working within the logic of the system rather than against it.

This chapter extends the debate on when individuals act to change power hierarchies on the following counts. We complement the system justification perspective by identifying the boundary conditions of action rather than inaction and complicity. We extend the social movement literature by dimensionalizing the conditions under which people act, and thereby, shift attention from elite activists and mere followers who are recruited through networks, to the activist within all members. We also add to the interchange between social movement theory and social psychology by developing the scope conditions under which protest and voice become overt rather than covert.

Before examining the factors that lead individuals to maintain such systems, we must first delineate exactly what we consider to be power. For the purposes of this chapter we define power as the ability to control resources, own and others', without social interference (for related definitions see Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Weber, 1947). This definition of power includes two primary elements – personal, and social power. Personal power involves having control over one's own resources and having autonomy to take action on one's own. Social power involves having control over others' resources. Social power often involves the capacity to influence others (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959). Since those who possess power depend less on the resources of others than vice versa, the powerful are more easily able to satisfy their own needs and desires.

In understanding when those in a subordinated position will act against their subordination, it is important to make a distinction between the sense of power and the possession of power. Although one's sense of power typically emerges from one's actual level of possessed power, an individual's sense of power can differ from the power that he or she actually possesses, and it can be more important in shaping thoughts, feelings, and behaviors than actual power (Anderson & Spataro, Chapter 4 of this volume). We define sense of power as the phenomenological, subjective experience of control over resources, own and others', combined with the belief that one is capable of influencing others and exerting control over the social environment.

In addition we need to clarify the level at which action is taken against a system. In thinking about how the powerless respond to their subordinated position, Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990) clarified the distinction between collective and individual action. They defined individual action as any attempt to improve one's personal condition, to move up the hierarchy individually. Collective action, on the other hand, is any activity that an individual undertakes to improve the condition of an entire group. As these actions are taken on behalf of the entire group, they can be undertaken by the collective, as in social movements, or they can be done individually. In this manner, an individual terrorist acting alone can still be seen as engaging in collective action because the action is taken on behalf of a collective.

WHY ACTIONS AGAINST AUTHORITY ARE SO RARE

Power hierarchies are often remarkably stable. Successful instances of revolt to upend oppressive systems are rare in comparison to the prevalence of such systems at the national, organizational, and group level. The powerful have a number of tools at their disposal that allow them to maintain their advantaged position. Since the powerful by definition have control over important resources, power can be maintained through procedures that re-tain that control. Furthermore, those with power can strategically provide these resources as a way of controlling the emotional states of those without power. By providing specific individuals with desirable resources (i.e., buy-ing them out or co-opting them), those with power can alleviate specific grievances without having to alter the hierarchical arrangements. This con-trol over resources can lead the powerless to accept being demeaned in order to acquire these desired resources; for example, De Cremer and Tyler (Chapter 1 of this volume) found that the desire to affiliate with powerful/high status, resource-rich groups will lead individuals to tolerate high levels of disrespect.

Moreover, the powerful have psychological devices at their disposal as well. The powerful proselytize hierarchy legitimizing myths – self-accepted truths that support discrimination and inequality (Pratto et al., 1994). Ster-eotyping is a related tool used frequently by those in power. Fiske (1993) points out that because stereotypes help to maintain one person's control over another, power promotes stereotyping, and stereotyping helps to maintain power. Self-fulfilling prophecies are another mechanism by which the powerful control the powerless. Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when a perceiver's false belief towards a target leads that belief to become reality

and to be essentially fulfilled (Merton, 1948). This belief or expectancy shapes the way the perceiver acts towards the target and unintentionally elicits and solicits behavior that is consistent with the expectancy. In addition, not only do expectancies channel social interaction to confirm the original expectancy, but they also affect self-perception processes; the target of the expectancy oftentimes comes to see him/herself in terms of the very trait that the perceiver expected him or her to possess (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981). For example, prisoners often come to see themselves as being weak and lacking any control whatsoever over their circumstances, even to the degree that widespread abuses, and even torture, become accepted practices among prisoners (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; New York State Special Commission on Attica, 1972; Saenz, 1986; Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1974). Thus, self-fulfilling prophecies are a method by which stereotypes are transferred from the powerful to the powerless, how the powerless come to see themselves as consistent with the stereotype.

System Justification Theory

The powerless maintain their subjugated status not only through the psychological processes of the powerful but also through their own devices. One might think that when confronted with oppression, that such oppression would be transparent, obvious, and abhorred and that one would react against it. Yet, the typical response is not only to endure such discrimination and degradation, but to not even see the oppression. In fact, low-status group members are less likely to attribute negative feedback to discrimination than are high-status group members (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995); even though low-status individuals actually suffer discrimination to a greater degree, they are less likely to attribute negative feedback to it.

Beyond the invisibility of their subordination, the powerless also justify hierarchies that perpetuate their lack of power. System justification theory contends that low-power individuals justify, psychologically support, and maintain systems that subordinate them (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The system justification process occurs at multiple levels. The powerless justify systems by seeing their subordinated position as being legitimate and this justification develops through what Jost and Banaji (1994) refer to as false consciousness. Indeed the powerless belie what is thought to be a pervasive human phenomenon, ethnocentrism, and in-group favoritism. For example, individuals from low-status universities, ethnicities, and gender groups

frequently exhibit out-group favoritism towards higher-status groups (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002).

This manner of inadequately applying false consciousness is combined in system justification theory with stereotyping. Whereas stereotyping by the powerful helps to protect and maintain the individual or group interests of those with power, system justification describes maladaptive negative self-stereotyping in which the powerless accept and support categorizations that subordinate and oftentimes demean them. This justification process provides an explanation for why women recreate stereotypes for themselves as less competitive compared to men (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992) and why some African-Americans come to value athletic ability at the expense of intellectual pursuits (Steele, 1992).

In addition, this system justifying false consciousness and self-stereotyping can create a psychological sense of superiority and self-righteousness concerning the benefits of one's subordinate position. Kay and Jost (2003) found that poor individuals self-righteously claimed that although they were less well-off economically, they were happier than the rich: The rich have money but lack the real contentedness that only the poor can find. The ''poor but happy'' and ''rich but sad'' stereotypes make existing social arrangements seem attractive and acceptable. This stereotype also relates to another psychological benefit that the powerless can get from their station: Stigma can provide people with a certain level of distinctiveness. Indeed when distinctiveness needs are particularly high, minority membership that is stigmatized is valued more than membership in a majority group (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993).

All in all, social unrest and group-based conflict are minimized by a number of psychological reactions by the powerless. But there are other more fundamental psychological processes that help to maintain stability in hierarchies and prevent their disruption.

Power and the Activation of the Behavioral Approach and Inhibition Systems

Power transforms not only beliefs about existing hierarchies, but also alters basic cognitive and behavioral processes. Keltner et al. (2003) proposed an integrative account for how power and powerlessness influence and direct cognition and behavior. Specifically, they theorized that power activates the behavioral approach system and powerlessness activates the behavioral inhibition system. High power is associated with a range of approach-related

cognitions and behaviors, including increased extraversion and impulsivity, reward sensitivity, and greater loquaciousness, whereas powerlessness is associated with neuroticism, shyness and anxiety, sensitivity to punishments, and general vigilance. In addition, both structural positions of power and the psychological sense of power lead directly to the taking of action whereas powerlessness leads to inaction (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003a). For example, Galinsky et al. (2003a) found that those without power were less likely to act against an obtrusive annoying stimulus that was placed in the environment; those in low-power did not take action to make their environment a better place to be. Thus, independent of any system justifying stereotypes or cognitions, those in low-power positions may maintain systems that denigrate them, because being in a low-power position activates the behavioral inhibition system, making all action, regardless of whether it is against a system, less likely to occur. The activation of the behavioral inhibition system and the tendency towards inaction help to explain why the powerless remain passively resigned and do not question their subordinate positions, nor take action to change their environment or the system in which they exist.

Power and Emotions

Connected to the activation of the behavioral approach and inhibition systems is the tendency for certain emotions to be associated with power and powerlessness. In addition to positive emotions such as desire, enthusiasm, and love (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001) and pride (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), power is also associated with aggressive emotions such as anger (Tiedens, 2001b). Powerlessness and subjugation, on the other hand, are associated with emotions such as sadness and guilt (Martin, 1993; Tiedens, 1999; Tiedens, 2001a). Indeed, the expression of certain emotions may be one mechanism by which individuals achieve status and power. Individuals who expressed sadness, whether they were political candidates, sitting presidents such as President Clinton, job candidates, or employees, were all perceived to be less competent and less likely to be conferred status, power, and leadership (Tiedens, 2001a).

Besides being associated with power, certain emotions are connected to action-oriented behaviors, whereas other emotions are associated with passivity and paralysis. In addition, different emotions are associated with different types of action readiness. Sadness, sorrow, and fear are associated with helplessness, avoidance and inhibition, or a general tendency to move

away; on the other hand, anger, rage, and annoyance are all associated with moving against (Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989). Moving away refers to flight and withdrawal and moving against refers to opposition and attack. Therefore, the very emotions associated with power are associated with different types of action readiness. Correspondingly, anger leads to greater risk seeking, while fear produces a state of risk aversion (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Another mechanism by which emotions produce different levels and types of action orientations is through attributional processes. Sadness leads to perceptions that situational forces produced an event, whereas the experience of anger leads individuals to perceive events to be caused by human agents and to see other individuals as responsible for the event (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993).

In one example of how emotions and action are related, Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) investigated reactions to real versus imagined instances of sexual harassment and discriminatory behavior in a job interview context. They found that, although women thought they would confront the harasser in some sort of direct way, either by refusing to answer one of the questions, leaving the interview, or even reporting the behavior to a supervisor, in actuality none of the women who actually experienced the harassment engaged in any of these responses. Predicted action and actual inaction were both driven by emotions. The women predicted that their dominant emotion would be anger in the face of sexually harassing questions, whereas for those who were actually faced with harassment, their most dominant emotion was fear and not anger.

These studies suggest that emotional states can play an integral role in preventing the oppressed from rising up against their oppressors. The work on the relationship between emotions and attributional thinking also suggests that emotions guide perceptions of the causes of social relationships. In the next section we turn to what system-based perceptions are necessary for individuals to feel compelled to act against a hierarchy that subordinates them.

Social Identity Theory

A basic motivational drive is to see the self in a positive light (Steele, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988). According to social identity theory, an individual's self-esteem is affected by individuals' membership in social groups; that is, social identities are an important part of the self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). One, therefore, derives positive self-esteem from membership in consensually valued, high-status groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) applied social identity theory to explain how

individuals respond to their station in a social hierarchy. The strategies that low-status individuals use to achieve positive social identities depend on the nature of group boundaries (i.e., how easy it is to move up the status hierarchy as an individual) and beliefs about the legitimacy and stability of existing status arrangements. Whether low-power individuals attempt to change a social system that subordinates them depends on these three factors.

The first factor is *permeability* which refers to how easy it is for an individual to rise up the hierarchy while working within the system. For a low-power individual to act against a hierarchy there must be no possibility for that person to achieve higher status; the boundaries between the powerless and the powerful must be highly stratified or impermeable. Evidence concerning fraternal compared to egoistic relative deprivation also suggests that protest and collective action depends on the perception that one's entire group and not just oneself is being deprived (Walker & Mann, 1987). Given even mere tokenism, low-power individuals will seek to achieve positive social identities through individual advancement by attempting to individually climb up the hierarchy while working within the rules of the system. Wright et al. (1990) found that even a hint of permeability was enough to lead disadvantaged individuals to attempt to achieve individual advancement within the system rather than attempt disruptive forms of action. Therefore, for action to be taken against a system there must exist almost no possibility for the powerless to improve their position in the hierarchy while working within the norms that govern the social system.

Yet, even if the walls between the powerful and the powerless are impenetrable, other conditions must still be present for action to be taken against a system. The second governing factor according to social identity theory is the perceived *stability* of the current hierarchical arrangements. Essentially low-power individuals ask themselves: Will those in power remain in power regardless of any action I take? It should be noted that norms form quickly (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985) within any social system and can lend an aura of stability even to arbitrarily determined social systems. Overcoming these perceptions of stability is necessary before effort is extended to change a system.

The third governing factor is the perceived *legitimacy* of the current hierarchical arrangements. Subordinated individuals who perceive the power hierarchy to be legitimate will not be motivated to change it. If those in power are perceived to have attained their positions in the system in a reasonable and legitimate way, then there would be no reason to attempt to change such a system. In addition, if the norms, rules, and parameters that regulate the current hierarchy are seen as having been legitimately established and fair,

then no action against such a system will be deemed necessary. Indeed, fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993) was developed from the group value model of justice to explain these attendant factors that produce individuals' obedience to authority. Fair procedures, such as being given a voice in decisions, indicate that the group respects them, whereas unfair procedures indicate that the group disregards them or is contemptuous of them (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Perceived level of procedural fairness can often be a more powerful predictor of implementation and system support than distributive outcomes. For example, perceived voice leads to a greater acceptance of defendants' verdicts whether they are for or against the defendant (Tyler, 1989). Accordingly, individuals often decide whether to obey the dictates of an authority based on their perceptions of that authority's general and historic legitimacy, and fairness.

Social identity theory stipulates that if any of these three conditions are present (permeability, stability, and legitimacy), then individuals will not act to change the system. These factors do in fact appear to be crucial for determining the psychological reactions to a subordinate position. Turner and Brown (1978) found that whenever a system was seen as legitimately established, those in low-status positions showed out-group favoritism, or a form of false consciousness that justified the existing social arrangements. Only when the system was seen as both unstable and illegitimate did low-status individuals show a significant amount of in-group favoritism. Although the three factors of permeability, stability, and legitimacy have been shown to be important determinants of identification with the subordinated group, no studies have formally manipulated all three factors to determine whether individuals will only attempt to change a power hierarchy if all of the factors are simultaneously absent (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Ng & Cram, 1988; Wright et al., 1990). Perceptions of the justness and legitimacy of hierarchies and the rules that support them serve to maintain such systems. We contend that when a hierarchical system is seen as impenetrably stratified, unstable and illegitimate, the powerless will cease to justify the system, but instead condemn it.

ANTECEDENTS OF ACTIONS AGAINST POWER HIERARCHIES

The above review highlights why action against hierarchies is so rare. Over and above direct threats and fears of punishments and reprisals, there are a

number of processes that lead the powerless away from action against the system, including the content of the powerless' thoughts (e.g., system justifying and hierarchy legitimizing beliefs), psychological processes (e.g., activation of the behavioral approach system), discrete emotions (e.g., sadness and fear), and system evaluations (e.g., it is legitimate, stable, and permeable). What factors lead the powerless to act against a social system, to try to disrupt a hierarchy that subordinates them? The above review provides some insight into when the powerless may be driven in the direction of taking action to change a system that derogates them. Particular perceptions about the nature of the hierarchy, certain emotions, and a sense of power may all be involved when the powerless make a call to arms.

Social Identity Mechanisms and Actions Against Authority

As previously mentioned, social identity theory predicts that for low-power individuals to act against a social hierarchy they must see that hierarchy as illegitimate and unstable with impermeable boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Low-power individuals will only seek to overturn a social hierarchy and reshape it when they perceive the system is *impermeable* to individual advancement and that they will never be able to individually advance into a higher position (Wright et al., 1990). Collective action will not take place when individuals can defect from their low-power group and individually achieve a high-power position through their own effort. In addition, subordinate individuals must believe that the power hierarchy is *illegitimate*. For example, only when they perceive those in power to have arrived there by illegitimate means, or that the hierarchy itself is based on fraudulent criteria, will they be motivated to rebel against the system. Indeed, perceptions of organizational injustice are associated with increased lawsuits (Bies & Tyler, 1993), an increased likelihood to publicly denigrate one's own company (Bies & Tripp, 1996), and inducing sympathy for, and interest in, various forms of worker protest including strikes and sit-ins (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 1993). When authorities are perceived to be unjust and illegitimate, actions are more likely to be taken to change the power structure to repair the perceived imbalance. This is often likely to occur when those in power are seen as possessing unmerited privileges (Rosette & Thompson, Chapter 11 of this volume).

Yet, it is not sufficient to only perceive that a system is illegitimate. Individuals must also perceive that the system is *unstable* before they will be motivated to struggle to change the power structure. Subordinate groups

must believe that a radical change in the social hierarchy is possible, that there is instability in the power relations between low- and high-power groups, before action will be taken against the hierarchy. Seeing a hierarchy as unstable and illegitimate can prevent system justifying beliefs and cognitions (Turner & Brown, 1978). It is when the oppressed perceive that their oppressor's grasp on power is tenuous that attempts will be made to wrench control and overthrow the powers that be.

Tajfel and Turner point out that these factors are the underlying and unifying factors that motivate rebellious acts to change power hierarchies and reshape the social structure; they thus apply to a range of situations, such as the civil rights movement in the United States, corporate sabotage, and even acts of terrorism. Research to date has not fully tested this model, although some partial support has been established. For example, Ng and Cram (1988) found that illegitimate and unstable power can lead to rebellion against mistreatment. A test of the necessity of all three component factors has yet to be completed. Moreover, research is needed to determine what conditions lead people to perceive a power hierarchy to be unstable, impermeable, and illegitimate. We consider this in the next section, where we describe how a sense of power and certain emotions may alter the powerless' perceptions of the hierarchy.

Sense of Power and Actions Against Authority

As previously discussed, Keltner et al. (2003) have suggested that power activates the behavioral approach system and that powerlessness activates the behavioral inhibition system. This dichotomous typology of action and inhibition orientations adds considerably to our understanding of power relations and individual's propensity to act or not. However, Horney (1939) suggested a third dimension on which power could affect behavior – rebelling or acting *against* others. Rather than simply acting or not acting, approaching or avoiding, sometimes individuals act against others. This acting against others may relate to power in a number of different ways. Those in power may act against those in low power when they feel their position of power is threatened in some way. Some evidence for this proposition comes from the finding that violence, although often suspected of being correlated with low self-esteem, is more often connected to high self-esteem (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Lashing out against others is most likely to occur when those with high self-esteem feel challenged in some way, when their inflated view of themselves has been disputed. But those in low power

may also be driven to act against others. We contend that those in low power may feel the disposition to act against others when they have a sense of power and especially when that sense of power is in sharp contrast to actual levels of hierarchical power and control (Anderson & Spataro, Chapter 4 of this volume).

As previously discussed, individuals who possess a sense of power are more likely to take action in general (Galinsky et al., 2003a). Galinsky et al. found that simply having participants think about a time when they had power was enough to increase levels of action taken. Priming power, therefore, seems sufficient to increase one's sense of power. For this reason, we contend that individuals who are in a subordinated position in a hierarchy but who have been primed with power and thus have a sense of power, will be less likely to do the bidding of those in the high-power position in the hierarchy and more likely to take action to change their subordination. Supportive evidence for this notion comes from work on the locus of control; individuals with a greater sense of control over their situations are less likely to conform to authority (Rotter, 1966).

A recent study examining the effects of sense of power by Galinsky et al. (2003b) serendipitously found evidence that having a sense of power can lead people to defy authority. In the course of running their experiment, they noticed that a large number of participants refused to cooperate with one aspect of the experimental protocol. Their study was designed to explore whether a sense of power affected perspective taking. Participants were primed with a sense of power by recalling a previous experience with power and perspective taking was measured by the direction of a letter E that participants were asked to draw on their forehead. As it turned out, a number of participants refused to draw the E on their forehead and these refusals depended on whether participants had been primed with high power or not. Nearly a third of those primed with high power refused to draw the E despite being instructed to by the experimenter, who was in a structural position of power. Power primed can be authority resisted.

Moreover, we contend that small increases in resources may lead to even greater increases in one's sense of power. An activating sense of power may also arise when there are more resources at one's disposal. Resource mobilization theory proposes that the success of social movements depends on resources available to participants, such as funding, time, and members' organizational skills (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). We suggest that a sense of power may catalyze the effect of these resources on the success of social movements. Relatively well-funded movements, such as nuclear activism, may feel a greater sense of power compared to less well funded,

non-specialized movements (Cook, 2001); this increased sense of power may arise despite the fact that they remain in a subordinated position relative to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, and other well-established organizations that decide nuclear policies.

The above analysis suggests that having a sense of power even while still in a subordinated position may be a necessary ingredient for the disposition to act against a system. How one feels about one's position may also be an important determinant of taking action against a system.

Emotions and Actions Against Authority

Emotions are often predictive of behavior and anger is one emotion that is predictive of acting against others. Anger is a negative emotional state that shows the same brain activity as other elements of the behavioral approach system (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998) and trait anger has been shown to be associated with assertiveness and competitiveness (Buss & Perry, 1992), with angry responses to failure leading to improved performance on subsequent tasks (Mikulincer, 1988). In addition to an association with power and the related disposition to take action, anger is also associated with an orientation to take action against those who demean and subjugate. Martin's (1993) and Woodzicka and LaFrance's (2001) work suggests that while emotions associated with low power such as fear inhibit action, emotions such as anger and pride are associated with taking action to change one's situation and rebel against those in positions of authority. Hochschild (1983) found that flight attendants needed to manage and control their anger in order to not take actions against rude first-class customers. Anger and pride may act as catalysts, providing the will to reverse the unwanted influence of cruel authorities. Understanding the current emotional state of the powerless may help us better predict when the powerless will act against a hierarchical system. In fact, researchers have begun to explore the importance of emotion in social movements (Horowitz, 2001), in particular, anger (Hercus, 1999; Gould, 2002).

Recent work has found that anger often plays an integral, contextualized role in catalyzing individuals to act against those with authority over them (Gould, 2001; Hercus, 1999; Martin, 1993). Gould's (2002) fieldwork found that members of the militant acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) activist movement ACT UP mobilized action by first transforming the gay communities' debilitating grief and fear into indignation and anger. Once this fear was turned into anger they used slogans such as "Turn Rage Into

Action'' and ''Angry? ACT UP'' to marshal that anger into action against the health authorities. Anger can motivate and lead individuals towards action against authority.

Since anger and pride are associated with high power and sadness, and fear and appreciation are associated with low power (Tiedens et al., 2000), we hypothesize that when low-power individuals experience the emotions that are typically associated with high power they will also feel a greater sense of power. This affect-induced increase in a sense of power may occur because individuals use their moods as a source of information in understanding their place in the world (Schwarz, 1990).

This rage and anger is also often the result of perceived injustice within a system (Clayton, 1992). When individuals perceive that they have been unduly restricted from exercising expected rights or obtaining assumed privileges, they will become angry and attempt to correct their circumstances. Responses to injustice are often linked to the emotions associated with high power (Keltner et al., 1993). However, the relationship between perceived injustice and anger are non-recursive; anger also triggers perceptions of injustice (Miller, 2000; Solomon, 1995). Injustices make us angry and when we are angry we are more likely to perceive, label, and be incited to act against injustices. In the next section we turn to how the three antecedent factors (sense of power, emotions, and perceptions of the hierarchy) interact with each other to determine the type of action that individuals may take against authority.

MULTIPLE ANTECEDENTS FOR ACTIONS AGAINST AUTHORITY

Thus far we have discussed some of the variables that likely come into play when the powerless act against their position. But is there an order to the dynamics of acting against? Early sociologists proposed that riots were the result of irrational mobs, infectiously fueling each other with blind, uncoordinated anger (Le Bon, 1921). However, recent analysis suggests that there is order to the madness, that riots follow certain rules. Researchers have sought more complete, integrated models that consider contextual and social factors beyond the mere contagion of emotions (McPhail, 1991). It does appear that passionate emotions by themselves are not a sufficient condition to produce collective actions (Tilly, 1978/1990). Collective action requires the mobilization of many strategic, rational actors acting according

to normatively accepted scripts for collective behavior called "repertoires of collective actions" (Tilly, 1986). The actions of rioters once an uprising has occurred are not driven by random events but are governed by a number of processes. Reicher (1984), in examining the St. Paul riots of 1980, concluded that crowd behavior is sophisticated and governed by social identity concerns.

This analysis, along with the other research on the sense of power and social identity described above, indicate that something other than simply feeling angry leads those in low power to take action. It appears that multiple factors coalesce to produce actions against authority and against systems that subjugate. We have discussed so far a number of factors, including perceptions of the hierarchy, the psychological sense of power, and particular emotions that might lead those without power to act against a system and hierarchy that subordinates them. We propose that actions taken by low-power individuals against those in authority are a function of the combined influence of an individual's sense of power, experience of emotions associated with high power, and perceptions of the hierarchy's illegitimacy, instability, and impermeability to individual advancement.

It has probably become clear that these elements may not exist independently of each other. Perceptions of legitimacy and stability, for example, are highly intertwined and naturally confounded in everyday life (Tajfel, 1981): Legitimate systems appear more stable and an unstable system can call into question its legitimacy. The model we propose encompasses these three primary antecedent conditions (sense of power, emotions, and perceptions of the hierarchy) which are often positively correlated with each other. As such, each element can act to abet and increase the experience of the other elements. These antecedent conditions can at times create a whirlpool of non-recursive interactions that can lead them all to be simultaneously present and produce an orientation to act against authority.

The experience of one element affects the experience of the other elements. As anger and power are associated with each other, a sense of power, even in the face of objective subordination, can inspire feelings of anger at one's subjugated position, but also feeling and expressing anger can sometimes increase one's sense of power. For example, ACT UP was able to turn anger into a sense of power. Though the Center for Disease control and Prevention (CDC) is an entrenched, stable organization, anger led ACT UP to believe that they had the power to force them to comply with their demands and revise the procedures for approving drugs. Their sense of power was exemplified in such slogans as "Turn the Power of the Quilt into Action."[2] Power and anger commingled to produce action to attempt to change the

way in which drugs are approved and in this instance their efforts were successful. We are interested in this chapter in the factors that lead to such rebellions against systems, whether they are successful or not.

Similarly, perceptions of illegitimacy can inspire anger and anger can lead one to see a subordinating hierarchy as illegitimate. A hierarchy that is perceived to be impermeable to individual advancement will not only prevent individuals from satisfying their own individual needs, but may also produce anger and indignation on the part of low-power individuals. When access to high-power positions is proscribed by the nature of the system, anger and fury may be the result. Feelings of anger and pride, as opposed to sadness and fear, are more likely to reduce the clouded vision that prevents individuals from perceiving the injustices inflicted upon them. A proud and angry servant is more likely to realize that the emperor has no clothes, compared to the sad and fearful one.

Research concerning procedural justice seems to bear out this relationship between anger and perceptions of legitimacy, defendants in court hearings who feel that they have been given voice, perceive the process to be more fair, are less angry, and are less likely to take action in the form of seeking an appeal (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler, 1989). The research on procedural justice generally suggests that perceptions of legitimacy can be controlled through regulations of affect. Giving people voice even when that voice produces no variations in distributive outcomes is enough to disperse anger and pacify the motivation to act against. Thus, when machinists are given more autonomy and control over their jobs, they are more satisfied and less angry at the system they toil under (Burawoy, 1979). Autonomy may also have affected perceptions of permeability, increasing the perception that individuals can advance through their own initiative.

Research on relative deprivation also suggests that when individuals perceive that a system prevents them from achieving outcomes they feel entitled to, they will become angry and will take action to change their situation (Crosby, 1976). Individuals will also seek retribution when they perceive that they are being denied some right or good, relative to what is provided to others (Greenberg, 1987). Collective actions require perceptions of relative deprivation, as well as a perception that sufficient resources exist (i.e., sense of power) to act against authority (Martin, 1986; Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984). A common belief holds that perceived injustices and the breaking of rules and norms merit acts of vengeance and retribution (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The perception of injustice does not result simply from objective inequality but requires attendant factors to be present as well.

Perceptions of illegitimacy can instill a sense of power that catalyzes individuals to take action to redress perceived injustices. Correspondingly, a sense of power influences and is affected by perceptions of stability and legitimacy of a power hierarchy. When people feel they have control over their environment, they may see a system that had shackled them, as being illegitimate. Furthermore, a sense of power may directly affect perceptions of stability, seeing the hierarchy as less fixed and reified. Moreover, an unstable hierarchy may allow people to feel a sense of power, so that they can reverse the hierarchy.

We suggest a model of action against authority that involves the joint, non-recursive influence of a sense of power, high-power emotions, and perceptions of the illegitimacy, instability, and impermeability of the social system all acting as a non-recursive whirlpool, with each abetting and increasing the other (see Fig. 1).

It should be noted that despite the non-recursive nature of these antecedent conditions for action against a hierarchy to take place, such action is rare and uncommon. How do we reconcile the positive relationships among the antecedent conditions with the infrequency of such actions? We contend that there must be a high level of one of the elements combined with a sufficient level of each of the other elements before they can start influencing each other in a positive feedback loop. These elements typically reinforce each other away from action, with sadness producing perceptions of stability and a sense of low power. But, at times, forces can increase each element independently and then they can "tip" (Gladwell, 2000) and increase each other in a non-recursive fashion.

Despite the fact that they can influence each other after this tipping point, not all of these elements will always be present. We claim that when all of these elements are present, full rebellion will be more likely to take place by those without power against a hierarchy. What happens when only some of the elements are present? We turn to this question next.


Fig. 1.   Non-recursive Model of Against Orientation.

ACTION AGAINST AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF OVERTNESS AND NORMATIVENESS

We propose that when the antecedent conditions are not simultaneously present (anger and pride, a sense of power, and perceptions of an unstable and illegitimate hierarchy that prevents individuals from rising up the ladder from the bottom rungs) then direct action to reverse or upend a hierarchy that subordinates someone will not be undertaken. The typical response will be no action. However, less extreme forms of action can occur if some of the factors are present.

Our model incorporates the distinction between two types of collective action, normative versus non-normative action (see Martin, 1986). Actions geared towards improving a group's (or individual's) station and position in a hierarchy oftentimes function within the confines of the current system; these actions conform to the norms that underlie the existing hierarchy and would be considered normative. Conversely, actions may be non-normative, existing outside the rules that govern the current social arrangements. Some civil libertarians contend that non-normative action is preferable when a system is unlikely to be uprooted. For example, Thoreau (1969) decried what he considered an illegitimate but stable and well-established social system; its stability necessitated non-violent action in the form of passive resistance to attempt small changes within the system.

Our model also incorporates the distinction between overt and covert action. "Two crucial aspects of social visibility are the degree to which elites comprehend (in some fashion) the political interests of those who oppose them and the degree to which the particular identities of those engaged in covert conflict are known" (Morrill et al., 2003). In overt politics, the identities of participants and their general political interests are relatively well known by elites and, more often than not, broader social audiences. In contrast, "for political conflict to be covert, it must avert the detection and direct engagement of various social audiences, especially elites and other authorities" (Morrill et al., 2003, p. 394). This is more likely to occur when authorities neither have knowledge of the political interests of actors nor the identities of actors.[3]

Full-fledged, overt, non-normative attempts to overturn a power structure through civil disobedience, such as the civil rights movement, are therefore differentiated from less overt aggression, for example corporate sabotage and work slowdowns. The Luddites rebelled in the late nineteenth century by sabotaging textile looms to slow the incursion of large manufacturers. However, we contend their low sense of power restricted their behavior to

covert acts of subversion, as opposed to open attempts to overturn the power hierarchy. Another example of action that is not overt and non-normative is a situation in which employees covertly lower their quotas by working more slowly in response to wage rates that are matched to a standard level of output per hour (Roy, 1952). However, such quota re-striction techniques only indicate that the employees are surreptitiously ''working the system'' instead of attempting to completely overturn the quota system. Lacking a sense of power to control one's situation, individuals often respond to frustration and injustice with sabotage (Giacalone, Riordan, & Rosenfeld, 1997) and organizational theft (Greenberg, 1993; Perlow & Latham, 1993). Organizational theft may be understood as an act of retributive justice in which employees attempt to rectify some grievance against the employer (Trevino, 1992).

Each of the antecedent factors may relate more to one factor than another. For example, anger may particularly relate to whether action is normative versus non-normative, with anger increasing the propensity to lash out in a non-normative way. Sense of power, on the other hand, may be a primary predictor of whether action is overt or covert; since power is disinhibiting (Keltner et al., 2003), a sense of power may reduce any fear of repercussions for actions taken against authority and thus, when members' sense of power increases they may be more likely to en-gage in overt action against elites. Indeed, empirical work is required to determine whether a sense of high power is a *necessary* factor for *overt* action to occur.

Not only will the antecedent conditions have direct effects on the type of emotion, but they should interact with each other to predict the type of action taken. We suggest that the level and type of action taken against hierarchies increases as more of the elements of our model are present (see Table 1). The most intense form of action involves overt, non-normative actions against authorities such as riots, terrorism, and revolutions. The next level of action involves non-normative actions that are covertly ex-pressed such as covert forms of sabotage (e.g., spreading computer viruses). Next are actions that are normative and overtly expressed, such as legal strikes or formal demands made through proxy statements at annual board meetings. The lowest level of action against authority includes normative actions that are covertly expressed, such as normatively following directives to the letter in such a way that work is hampered and efficiency reduced.

We predict that the actions taken against hierarchies are more likely to become more overt and non-normative as more of the factors are present. Future research should examine the precise relationships of these antecedent

Table 1. Typology of Actions Against Authority.

	Overt	Covert
Non-normative	Terrorism Riots, revolutions Overt sabotage Wildcat strikes	Covert sabotage (computer viruses, defacing property) Sabotage by circumvention (work slow downs, social loafing, quota restriction, and goldbricking) Compensatory or justice-motivated theft Hidden transcripts (comedy, gossip, and hidden carnivals)
Normative	Proxy statements at annual shareholder meetings Strikes, protest rallies (normative as long as laws not broken)	Work-to-rule (obey rules to paralyze work)

factors (sense of power, emotions, and perceptions of the system) to the typology of action taken. Perhaps at the highest level of intensity, when a high sense of power, high-power emotions, and system illegitimacy and instability coexist, will members be most likely to engage in overt, non-normative action against the elite – action designed to overthrow the system and reverse or purge that hierarchy. At a reduced level of intensity, perhaps when anger and system illegitimacy coexist but without a sense of power, members will be likely to engage in covert, non-normative action against elites. Covert, normative action against elites, such as work to rule, may exist when a system is seen as illegitimate but stable, and the subordinated individuals lack a sense of pride. Finally, when none of the three conditions are present we predict that members are unlikely to act against authority and will accept the status quo.

A careful examination is necessary to understand the exact relationship between the antecedent factors and the types of actions taken. For instance, as more of the factors are present there may be an increase in the number of non-normative actions; however, this non-normative increase may actually be an inverted "U" shaped curve. For example, actions against authority may return to a more normative level again as a groups' sense of power increases. Normative actions such as proxy statements overtly directed at firms during annual shareholder meetings would be an example of this. This

normative, overt form of action against authority would be more likely if the actors had an increased sense of power. In fact, lacking a sense of power is associated with impulsivity and actions that are detrimental to one's own well being in primates (Fairbanks, 2001). The more powerful one is, the more likely one is to define resources creatively and use existing institutional frameworks to his/her advantage. By contrast, the weaker one is (especially when one feels that the system is stable and closed, and yet feels angry) the more likely one is to use non-normative tactics. For example, federal and state enforcement of criminal penalties on anti-abortion demonstrators who blocked clinics led to a decline of peaceful clinic protests, even as some anti-abortion activists adopted more disruptive tactics (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

It is important to note that some non-normative behaviors, such as revolutions, are designed to reverse the hierarchy and other times non-normative behaviors, such as riots, are simply an expression of anger – expressions that can unintentionally preserve disadvantage rather than reverse it. The riots that shook Los Angeles in 1991, after what was widely perceived to be an illegitimate verdict in the Rodney King trial, provide an example of such non-normative behavior. Angry rioters clearly perceived the system to be unjust and illegitimate. However, they also probably accepted that the system was firmly established, stable and not likely to be overturned. This may partly explain why most of the violence during these riots ended up being directed against the rioters' own communities, as opposed to the system of authority. A movement whose motto was ''No Justice'' scarcely took root after the riots, perhaps due to a sense of futility about the deeply entrenched and stable judicial and political system.

Finally, as a corollary to our model, future research could examine how these antecedent factors impact the psychology of the *powerful* and how they respond to the action and voice of the subordinated. The emotions, sense of power, and perceptions of the system that favors them, may predict when the advantaged will actively suppress revolts or when the demands of the subordinated will be acceded to. The defenders of power hierarchies are likely to fight more fiercely to maintain the status quo if they perceive it to be legitimate, stable, and open to social advancement by those lower in the hierarchy. For example, an archival analysis of the ACT UP's success in attaining changes in the process of drug approvals might indicate whether members of the CDC felt their sense of power, as well as self-perceived legitimacy, diminishing as the media and popular opinion swelled against them.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have attempted to integrate divergent literatures and research including system justification theory, social identity theory, emotions, and the approach-inhibition theory of power into a model that predicts when and how those in low power will take action against authorities and systems that subordinate them. Our model also extends the literature on social movements by going beyond specifying the macro-structural conditions that promote collective action to explicate when the activist within the subordinated may be aroused. We have identified three antecedent psychological processes – a sense of power, emotions associated with power (e.g., anger and pride), and perceptions that the system is illegitimate, unstable, and impermeable to individual advancement – that we have proposed independently and interactively determine the type of action. These three antecedent conditions help to predict when the activist within the subordinated will be awakened and inspire system condemnation, and when the activist will remain dormant, a mere enabler and justifier of the current hierarchical relationships.

NOTES

1. When individuals take action to change power hierarchies also is an issue that has attracted the attention of political scientists. Much of political sociology draws on the social movement literature and so we do not review it independently. We note that rational choice political scientists treat the problem of changing the system as a collective goods problem in the tradition of Olson (1968), and suggest that individuals join collective effort when there are selective incentives. We acknowledge this literature, but develop an identity-based account of action rather than an incentive-based explanation.

2. The AIDS quilt was a powerful, unifying symbol connecting AIDS activists with the wider public. The quilt itself included thousands of hand-sewn designs representing those who had died of AIDS. ACT UP embarked on a highly popular cross-country tour to display the quilt, which successfully galvanized interest and activism by transforming grief into anger and activism (Gould, 2002).

3. Covert and overt actions can also be differentiated in terms of whether the identities of actors is known or not or whether the actions themselves are visible or not. We understand that covert and overt actions can be more broadly defined to include these distinctions. However, we restrict our definition to whether actors' interests are known or not. Examples of overt action would thus include Oaxacan insurgents who have press conferences while wearing ski masks; undisclosed, invisible undermining of financial markets by established anticapitalists; invisible computer-slowing viruses infecting abortion clinics sent within Right to Life campaign e-mails.

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